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Bristol and Newfoundland 1490-1570 (eprint) 
 
Evan Jones 
 
This is a pre-print of an article published in: Iona Bulgin, Cabot and His World 
Symposium, June 1997 (Newfoundland Historical Society, 1999) 
 
When people discuss the Cabot voyages, there is a tendency to concentrate on the personal 
and particular: the character of Cabot, the story of the voyages, the location of the landfall.  
Yet although these aspects of the explorations grab the imagination, they provide little 
information about why the expeditions were mounted or what the nature of England’s early 
involvement in North America was.  This paper will attempt to rectify this imbalance by 
asking and seeking to answer some of the questions about the voyages that are rarely posed.  
In particular it will address the issue of why Bristol’s merchants became interested in 
westward discovery in the first place and why they then lost interest in Newfoundland until 
the late 16th century, leaving the exploitation of the fisheries to the French, Portuguese and 
Spanish.  
 
To address these issues will first require an examination of how Bristol’s commerce was 
changing in the late 15th century and why its commercial development prompted an interest in 
westward discovery.  There will then be a consideration of what Bristol’s merchant’s were 
trying to achieve during the ten years they were involved in the exploration of the New World.  
After 1508, Bristol’s interest in North America faded.  Since the city had an early lead in the 
exploration of the region, the paper will seek to establish why the city failed to become 
involved in the Newfoundland fisheries.  To do this, it will first be necessary to establish the 
actual level of England’s involvement in the fisheries.  It will then be possible to address the 
issue of why the country as a whole and Bristol in particular failed to engage in them before 
the 1570s.  
 
By 1450 Bristol was already one of the most prosperous and successful towns in England.  
The city was heavily engaged in the manufacture of woollen cloth and it exported both its own 
cloth and that of the West Country, the Midlands and Wales.  Yet, although the city’s 
merchants traded as far afield as Iceland and Portugal, the Gascon trade dominated their 
international commerce.  The reasons for this were essentially political.  One factor behind the 
importance of the Gascon trade was that until 1453, this part of western France was English 
territory.  As a result English merchants had special privileges in the region’s commerce that 
allowed them to virtually monopolise the export of its most valuable product, claret wine.   
Since this trade was highly lucrative, and England’s political control over Gascony meant that 
the trade was never subject to embargoes or political interference, Bristol’s merchants had 
allowed themselves to become comfortably dependent on Gascony.1  However, although 
Bristol benefited from the trade, France’s determination to take control of Gascony restricted 
the city’s trading opportunities elsewhere.  This was because the resulting conflict between 
England and France, known at the Hundred Years War, prevented English merchants from 
trading into other parts of France, while Castile’s support for France limited the development 
of England’s trade with Spain.  Since trade into the Mediterranean was controlled by the 
1 E. M. Carus-Wilson, ‘The Overseas Trade of Bristol’ in E. Power & M. M. Postan Studies in English Trade in 
the Fifteenth Century (London, 1933), pp. 201-09 
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Italians, and Iceland and Ireland offered only limited opportunities for Bristol merchants, they 
were effectively forced to concentrate on Gascony.   
 
As politics shaped Bristol’s commercial concerns in the first half of the 15th century, it was 
politics that determined the realignment of Bristol’s trade in the latter part of the century.  The 
key event behind this shift was the end the Hundred Years and the consequent loss of Gascony 
to the French.  On one level this was a disaster for Bristol’s merchants since it severely 
depressed the Gascon trade for the next twenty years and it meant that this trade was 
thenceforth no more secure than any other branch of Bristol’s foreign trade.  However, in the 
long term the loss of Gascony was beneficial to Bristol’s commerce, since the loss of this 
secure market forced Bristol’s merchants to broaden their commercial base, while the end of 
the war opened-up new commercial opportunities to them. 
 
For Bristol, the most important side effect of the end of the Hundred Years War, was that 
Anglo-Spanish relations improved.  In 1466 a formal peace treaty was signed between 
England and Spain in the decades that followed a political alliance developed between them.  
As this occurred, both countries made an effort to stamp-out the piracy which had plagued 
their trade, and the increased security of the seas, along with the higher level of commercial 
confidence which the alliance engendered, created the conditions in which Anglo-Iberian 
trade could flourish.  Of those merchants who took advantage of this development, none did 
better than the merchants of Bristol, who increased their trade to Spain ten-fold between the 
1460s and the 1490s.2  
 
In terms of the voyages of discovery, the growth of Bristol’s trade with Iberia was important 
for two reasons.  First, it brought Bristol’s merchants into closer commercial and cultural 
contact with the people who were leading Europe’s exploration of the Atlantic.  Second, it 
gave the city’s mariners a greater experience of long ocean voyages, as they began to trade, 
not only with Spain and Portugal, but with the newly colonised Atlantic islands.  Between 
1431 and 1460 Spain and Portugal had discovered and colonised nine islands in the Canaries, 
Cape Verdes and the Azores.  By 1480 Bristol men were trading with Madeira, and woad was 
being brought to Bristol direct from the Azores.  After the signing of the Treaty of Medino del 
Campo in 1489, English merchants were allowed to trade to all the islands north of Cape 
Verdes.3  The late 15th century thus saw Bristol’s commercial horizons expand and made its 
merchants aware of the benefits that could be reaped by those who discovered new lands.  
That it was this contact which encouraged them to begin their own voyages of discovery is 
indicated by the way their first voyages, of 1480/1, were aimed at discovering the island of 
Brasil, which was believed to lie somewhere to the west of Ireland. Since this mythical island 
was reputed to be a source of a wood valuable to dyers, it appears that Bristol was trying to 
emulate Iberia by seeking out islands which could be exploited commercially.  Whether their 
explorations met with any success is uncertain, but there is some evidence to suggest that 
Bristol’s merchants had reached North America before 1497 and that it was their success at, as 
well as their attitude towards, oceanic exploration that attracted Cabot to the city.4  
 
That Bristol provided the support for the voyages of John Cabot in 1497 and 1498 is well 
known.  It is also clear that Bristol men were the major backers behind voyages made in 1501 
2 W. R. Childs, Anglo-Castilian Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Manchester, 1978) p. 64 
3 J. A. Williamson, The Cabot Voyages and Bristol Discovery under Henry VII (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 10, 14-16 
4 Williamson, The Cabot Voyages and Bristol Discovery under Henry VII, pp. 19-32 
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and 1502 under a new patent and that Bristol was heavily involved in the creation of the 
‘Company Adventurers to the Newfoundland’ in 1502.  It is unclear when this company 
ceased to operate, but it certainly made voyages in 1503, 1504 and 1505, which took its 
members far enough down the American coast for them to find mountain-cats and popinjays.5   
Nevertheless, although it is probable that Bristol was involved in Sebastian Cabot’s 
expedition of 1508-9, after this expedition Bristol’s substantiated interest in North America 
fades.  England was involved in further expeditions of discovery in 1517, 1527 and 1536, but 
these were all Crown financed and did not involve Bristol men.6  
 
To understand why Bristol was so intensely involved in the exploration of the New World 
during the first decade after 1497, and why it then dropped its involvement, it is necessary to 
appreciate what the voyages were meant to achieve.  As noted earlier, Bristol’s voyages of 
discovery during the 1480s aimed at finding an island in the Atlantic which offered similar 
economic potential to the islands discovered by the Iberians.  However, once Cabot had 
persuaded Bristol’s merchants that they might be able to push a route through to the Orient, 
the purpose of Bristol’s voyages changed.  The discovery of a route to the Orient was the 
avowed purpose of both the 1497 and 1498 voyages of Cabot and the subsequent voyages 
from Bristol.  This remained the purpose even after it became clear that the new lands were 
not part of Orient, for although North America might offer some economic potential, it 
seemed that the greatest rewards would go to those who could identify and control a trade-
route to the East.  It appears to have been with this purpose in mind that the ‘Company 
Adventurers to the Newfoundland’ was established.  Although little is known about the 
company, its title indicates that it was commercially orientated and from what is known about 
its activities it seems that it may have tried to establish bases along the American coast.  Such 
a strategy should not be surprising given that it was not known how far the new world 
stretched, or how far it was to the Orient. Indeed, since Portugal had succeeded in reaching 
India by establishing a series of commercial bases along the African coastline, the activities of 
the men of the Newfoundland Company was entirely logical.  Trade thus remained the 
primary intention of Bristol’s merchants and given that by 1508 they had established that 
between the Ice and the Spanish territories there lay a continual landmass, inhabited by people 
who possessed nothing worth trading, it is unsurprising that Bristol’s merchants became 
discouraged.  Nevertheless, having failed to establish a commercial link with the Orient, what 
needs to be determined is whether they tried to exploit the new lands in any other way.  In 
particular, what needs to be determined is whether they followed-up their 1497 boast that 
‘they could bring so many fish that this kingdom would have no further need of Iceland, from 
which place there comes a very great quantity of the fish called stockfish.’7  This will be the 
subject of the second part of this paper. 
 
Although it is widely accepted that the French and Portuguese were the primary movers in the 
development of the Newfoundland fisheries, it has always been assumed that the English 
retained a fishery there and some have assumed that it came to replace the old Iceland 
fisheries.8   However, since little evidence has been provided to support such arguments, it 
5 Williamson, The Cabot Voyages and Bristol Discovery under Henry VII, p. 134 
6 J. A. Williamson (ed.), The Voyages of the Cabots  and the Discovery of North America (New York, 1970), pp. 
245, 256, 268 
7 Letter from Raimondo de Raimondi de Soncino to the Duke of Milan, 18 December 1497: J. A. Williamson 
(ed.), The Voyages of the Cabots  and the Discovery of North America (New York, 1970) p. 31 
8 C. H. Judah, The North American Fisheries and British Policy to 1713, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 
Vol. XVIII,  nos. 3-4 (Illinois, 1933) pp. 12, 15; H A Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International 
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needs to be established whether anything that can be described as an English fishery did exist 
before the 1570s.  
 
The most general form of evidence that has been used to support the existence of an English 
fishery comes from port-books.  In her study of England’s Newfoundland fishery, Gillian Cell 
notes that ‘port book evidence suggests that only a handful of vessels went annually to 
Newfoundland during the greater part of the sixteenth century’.9  By noting this she 
downplays the importance of the English fishery but apparently also establishes its existence.   
Unfortunately, what this fails to appreciate is that any Newfoundland fish recorded in an 
English port book could not be a product of an English fishery.  This is because fish caught by 
Englishmen and brought straight home was not be liable to pay custom and was thus not 
recorded in the port books.  So, by definition, Newfoundland fish recorded in the port books 
must be imports from a third country, such as France. 
 
The earliest specific evidence that has been put forward for an English fishery are two letters 
written on 21 August 1522 from Vice-Admiral Fitzwilliam to Henry VIII and Wolsey.  The 
letters were written while England was at war with France and they refer to plans to send 
English ships westwards to meet with a fleet returning from Newfoundland.  Biggar 
interpreted these letters as orders for naval ships to meet-up with and escort the English 
Newfoundland fleet home.10  However, these documents, and an earlier letter that Biggar did 
not note, do not state that the Newfoundland fleet was English or that the naval ships were 
dispatched in order to escort, or ‘waft’, the fleet home.11  Given this, letters could be referring 
to an intended attack on the returning French Newfoundland fleet.  That this was in fact the 
case is indicated by the way Fitzwilliam notes in one letter that a certain Captain West could 
not go on the mission because he did not have enough victuals; ‘whereof I am right sorye; ffor 
I assure your grace, by that that I can here perceyve, he have doon his dutie here right well, 
and is worthy thankes’.12  Now this is significant, for right up till the 19th century, the way a 
commander gave thanks to a good captain was not by sending him on convoy duty, but by 
sending him on a cruise that offered the possibility of a prize.  The desirability of this 
commission is further demonstrated by the admiral’s attempts to persuade the King that 
Fitzwilliam’s own protégé, Baldwin Willoughby, should go instead, despite the fact that he 
had only recently joined the navy.13  
 
The next evidence that has been cited to support the existence of an English fishery is that 
relating to Hore’s voyage of 1536.  Although Hakluyt records this as a voyage of exploration, 
Economy (Toronto, 1954), p. 13; G T Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland 1577-1660 (Toronto, 1969), pp. 
3, 22; B. E. Gelsinger, Icelandic Enterprise. Commerce and Economy in the Middle Ages (Columbia, 1981) p. 
194 
9 Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland, p. 22 
10 H. P. Biggar, The Precursors of Jacques Cartier 1497-1534 (Ottawa, 1911), pp. 142-3 
11 The earlier letter was written by Fitzwilliam on 4 August and discusses the merits of sending particular ships 
into the west. It suggests ‘The Gabrell of Topsham and the Trinitie George would do better service in the West 
Sea, as well for the return of the fishermen from the New Found Land, as for the going of the French into 
Scotland, than the others in the narrow Sea.’: Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, Vol. III, pt. ii, No. 2419. The term 
‘wafting’ is the one normally used to describe the convoying of the Iceland fleet: Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, 
Vol. IV, pt. i, 1524-26, No. 571, 691 
12 Biggar, The Precursors of Jacques Cartier, p. 143 
13 Biggar, The Precursors of Jacques Cartier, p. 142.  Willoughby is described by Fitzwilliam as ‘my servant’ as 
late as January 1522. His first appointment as a captain of one of the King’s ships was in April: Letters and 
Papers – Foreign & Domestic, Henry VIII, Vol. III, pt, ii, 1519-23, No. 1946, 2193 
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it has been suggested that it was an ordinary fishing voyage, for a contemporary court record 
indicates that while away Hore ‘caught fish or caused them to be caught.’14  However, since 
Hakluyt’s account indicates that the ship went far further north than would be normal for a 
fishing expedition and since a large number of gentlemen accompanied the vessel, Hore’s ship 
cannot have been part of an ordinary fishing fleet.15   
 
The next piece of evidence that has been used to justify the existence of an English 
Newfoundland fishery is a 1548 ‘Acte againste the exaction of money or other thinge by any 
officer to traffike in to Iceland’.16   This Act concerned ‘ suche merchaunts and fysshermen as 
have used and practysed the adventures and journes into Iselande Newfoundeland Ireland and 
other places commodious for fyshinge, and getting fishe’ and provided that they should be 
free of exaction’s from officers of the Admiralty.  By mentioning Newfoundland, the 
legislation suggests that Englishmen did at least sometimes go there.  However, since the 
legislation was general in its application, and the places mentioned are only referred to by way 
of illustration, it would be wrong to infer from this that England had a large and established 
fishery there.  
 
The last pre-1570s evidence for a Newfoundland fishery is that in 1563 a London merchant, 
John Link, is reported to have sustained losses while returning from a voyage to 
Newfoundland.17  This indicates that by this time at least some Englishmen were travelling 
there but it is unclear whether Link’s voyage was typical for its time. 
 
Turning to other sources of evidence which should throw light on whether there was an 
established English fishery in Newfoundland, it may be noted that if such a fishery existed, it 
should be possible to find some mention of it in England’s surviving state papers of the 16th 
century.  The calendars of these papers provide summaries of hundreds of thousands of 
official letters and reports, and although the great majority of them have nothing to do with 
fishing, they are dozens of references to both the English Iceland fleet and the French 
Newfoundland fleet.  However, they contain no references to an English fleet or fishery in 
Newfoundland before the 1570s.  This is peculiar because many of the matters dealt with in 
the papers concern issues which should have cropped-up if the English had maintained a 
fishery in Newfoundland.  For instance, the papers dealing with the Iceland fisheries include 
references to disputes between English and foreign fishermen, concerns over the security of 
the English fleet in time of war, notification of the seizure of vessels by foreign privateers, and 
references to the Crown’s right of prisage (a form of tax of fish) on ships returning from 
Iceland.18  Apart from these tangential references there are also a few complete lists of the 
English ships returning from Iceland and a mid-century report on the state of England’s 
fisheries; which mentions the fisheries in Iceland, Scotland and the North Sea but, 
significantly, makes no mention of Newfoundland.19  For their part, the English reports on the 
French Newfoundland fisheries mention the illegal stopping or seizure of French ships 
14 E G R Taylor, ‘Master Hore’s voyage of 1536’ The Geographical Journal, Vol. LXXVII (1931), pp. 469-70 
15 Williamson, The Voyages of the Cabots  and the Discovery of North America, pp. 268-71 
16 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. IV pt. I (London, 1819), pp. 44-45 
17 Judah, The North American Fisheries, p. 27 
18 Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, Vol. I, pt. ii, 1513-14, No. 1971: Vol. III, pt. ii, 1519-23, No. 2431; Vol. IV, 
pt. i, 1524-26, No. 549, 571, 615, 2220; Vol. IV, pt. ii, 1526-28, No. 4740; Vol. V, 1531-32, No. 1231; 
Calendar of State Papers – Domestic, 1547-80, p. 94; Calendar of State Papers – Foreign, 1561-62, No. 302; 
1563, No. 1088; 1578-9, No. 577 
19 Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, Vol. IV, pt. ii, 1526-8, No. 5101; Vol. VI, 1933, No. 1380; Calendar of State 
Papers – Domestic, 1601-3 & Addenda 1547-65, p. 426 
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carrying Newfoundland fish, intelligence reports about the French Newfoundland fleet, and 
wartime accounts of the capture of, or attempts to capture, French vessels on their return from 
Newfoundland.20  However, despite the fact that England was frequently at war with France 
during the 16th century, and the French were dominant in the Newfoundland fishery, concerns 
are never expressed about the safety of English vessels in Newfoundland.  There is also never 
any mention of English vessels being captured while operating in, or returning from, 
Newfoundland. 
 
To conclude, the evidence for England’s involvement in Newfoundland fishery from the 
1500s to 1570 rests on two references: a 1548 Act of Parliament, which only mentions 
Newfoundland by way of illustration, and a 1563 reference to the activities of a single London 
merchant.  Since the State Papers of the period contain no further references to an English 
fishery in Newfoundland, despite the frequent references which are made to the French 
Newfoundland fishing fleet and England’s other fisheries, there is no reason to believe that an 
established English fishery existed in Newfoundland before the 1570s.  In this light it is much 
less surprising that on his voyage to the New World in 1527 the English explorer, John Rut, 
observed off Newfoundland ‘50 Spanish, French and Portuguese fishing-vessels’ but no 
English.21  It is also easier to comprehend Anthony Parkhurst’s analysis of the fisheries in the 
1570s.  Parkhurst was a Bristol man who made at least four voyages to Newfoundland in the 
1570s.22  In a letter written in 1577 or 1578 he wrote of England’s Newfoundland fishery that 
it ‘ys well amended within v yeres from iiii sayle of small barkes to fortye, whereof the one 
halfe ar worthy shippes, so that I dare be bolde to affirme to brynge home as mutche fysshe in 
some one of these as all the navy did before’.23  Given that there is very little evidence of an 
English fishery before the 1570s, it seems likely that even the four small barks of the early 
1570s may have represented an improvement over earlier decades. 
 
If England had no involvement, or at least no significant involvement, in the Newfoundland 
fisheries until the 1570s, the question that needs to be addressed is why there was a lack of 
interest in the fisheries.  This issue is best addressed in two parts, first by examining the 
general lack of interest in England as a whole and then by examining why Bristol’s merchants 
failed to live-up to their 1497 claim that they could bring fish home so many fish from 
Newfoundland that England would have no further need of Iceland.  
 
On the first point, it appears that the lack of interest in the nation as a whole was due in large 
part to England’s continued ability to acquire stockfish from Iceland.  Although England’s 
involvement in Iceland has been portrayed as a phenomenon of the 15th century, this is only 
because England lost its near monopoly over the Iceland stockfish trade in the latter part of 
that century.24  However, while Hamburg became the leading player in the 16th century, 
20 Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, Vol. IV, pt. i, 1524-26, No. 83; Vol. V, 1531-2, No. 627; XVII, 1542, No. 
738, 835, 1220; Vol. XIX, pt. ii, 1544, No. 302; Vol. XXI, pt. i, 1546, No. 1445; Calendar of State Papers – 
Domestic 1547-80, p. 565; Calendar of State Papers – Foreign, Vol. III, 1560-61, No. 120, 1569-71, No. 340 
21 Rut’s failure to find any English vessels is apparently confirmed by his dispatch of a letter to Henry VIII on 
one of the foreign vessels he found at St Johns: Williamson, The Voyages of the Cabots  and the Discovery of 
North America, pp. 105, 107 
22 E. G. R. Taylor (ed.) The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts (2 vols. 
Hakluyt Society, 1935) Vol. I, p. 128 
23 Taylor, The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts Vol. I, p. 123 
24 E. M. Carus-Wilson, ‘The Iceland Trade’ in E. Power & M. M. Postan Studies in English Trade in the 
Fifteenth Century (London, 1933), pp. 177-82; Gelsinger, Icelandic Enterprise. Commerce and Economy in the 
Middle Ages, p. 194 
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England remained heavily engaged in Iceland and may even have increased its trade there. 
The extent of England’s involvement in Iceland is indicated by the way in 1528, 149 English 
ships visited Iceland; in 1533, 85 ships, mostly of 50-100 tons burden went there, and even in 
the 1550s, after a period of falling demand for fish, 43 English ships still visited the island.25  
England’s dependence on Iceland is expressed by a letter written in 1523, when Lord Surrey 
wrote that if the Iceland fleet were intercepted by Scottish privateers ‘ the coasts of Norfolk 
and Suffolk will be undone and all England destitute of fish next year’.26  This reliance on 
Iceland could still be noted in 1578 when Anthony Parkhurst wrote of England’s 
Newfoundland fisheries that ‘The trade that our nation hath to Island maketh that the English 
are not there in such numbers as other nations.’27 
 
Having explained England’s general lack of interest in Newfoundland in terms of its ability to 
acquire stockfish from Iceland, it might be assumed that Bristol’s lack of interest in the region 
is also explained.  However, what is interesting about Bristol is that although England as a 
whole maintained its trade to Iceland, Bristol dropped out of the Iceland trade in the second 
half of the 15th century.  Indeed after 1460, only one Bristol merchant maintained a 
significant trade with Iceland and among the three surviving customs accounts of the 1480s 
and 1490s; there is only one reference to a ship sailing there from Bristol.28  The city thus lost 
interest in Iceland well before 1497 and, for that matter, well before any possible discovery of 
the Newfoundland fisheries in the 1480s.29  Bristol’s failure to develop the Newfoundland 
fisheries must thus have a deeper cause than access to Icelandic stockfish.  To understand 
what underlay its lack of interest requires a renewed appreciation of just what was happening 
to Bristol’s commerce in the late 15th and 16th centuries. 
 
In the first part of this paper it was noted during the late 15th century Bristol was expanding 
its commercial horizons.  Although this included voyages to such exotic locations as Madiera 
and the Azores, the greatest growth was in the Spanish trade.  This is significant because it 
seems that it was the expansion of the Spanish trade that lay behind the reduction of Bristol’s 
Icelandic trade.  The reason for this is that although Bristol had been the dominant player in 
England’s Icelandic trade from the 1420s-50s, the Icelandic stockfish trade had always been a 
subsidiary component of the city’s overall trading interests.  As noted earlier, Gascony 
dominated the city’s trade until 1453.  Nevertheless, since the Gascon trade occurred almost 
entirely during the autumn and winter, it meant that the capital and ships of Bristol’s 
merchants were underemployed during the spring and summer.  The Iceland trade, which 
occurred during the summer, thus provided a commercial outlet at a slack time of the year.  
However, as the Bristol’s Iberian trade expanded, the opportunities for summer trading 
increased.  This was because some of the goods that could be imported from Iberia, and in 
particular the iron from Northern Spain, could be traded at this time of year.  So Bristol 
appears to have lost interest in Iceland because it was more profitable to trade Spanish iron 
than Icelandic stockfish. 
25 Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, Vol. IV, pt. ii, 1526-8, No. 5101; Vol. VI, 1933, No. 1380; Calendar of State 
Papers – Domestic, 1601-3 & Addenda 1547-65, p. 426 
26 Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, Vol. III, pt. ii, 1519-23, No. 3071 
27 R. Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation Vol. VIII 
(Glasgow edition, 1904), p. 11 
28 W. R. Childs, ‘England’s Icelandic trade in the fifteenth century: The role of the port of Hull’ Northern Seas 
1995, pp. 21-22 
29 Quinn, among others, have explored the possibility that Bristol discovered the fisheries on or after 1481: D. B. 
Quinn, England and the Discovery of America, 1481-1620 (London, 1973) pp. 5-23 
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Bristol’s loss of interest in Iceland can thus be ascribed to its increased commercial 
opportunities in Iberia and the Iberian colonies rather than a desire to engage in the 
Newfoundland fisheries.  That this condition remained the norm for most of the 16th century, 
is observable from the way that Bristol never again engaged in Iceland and, as has been seen, 
there is no evidence that it engaged in the Newfoundland fisheries before the 1570s.30  It was 
thus only when Bristol’s trade to Iberia was cut-off in the late 16th century by England’s war 
with Spain that it became worthwhile for Bristol, along with the other West-country ports, to 
renew its interest in Newfoundland.  
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